Is Vedanta a School of Thought?

A school of thought is always the contention of a given person or persons.  Being what it is, a contention is subject to dispute.  The contender's means of knowledge, such as the perception and inference, should find access to the object of any contention.  The contender's self, which is the subject matter of Vedanta, is not available for the contender's means of knowledge.  If it is, then who is the subject who employs the means of knowledge?   Suppose I am the subject.  How can I be the object about which I have contention?  So the subject matter of Vedanta, which is atma, can never be a school of thought.

Any thought regarding the atma is a speculation.  The Upanishads themselves make this clear.  "Understand that to be Brahman (atma) which is not objectified by the mind and because of which the mind knows everything." Analyzing the subject matter of Vedanta in the light of various schools of thought prevalent in his time, Vyasa presents Vedanta as a means of knowledge (pramana) for knowing Brahmatma (the self being Brahman),  Therefore, to consider Vedanta as another school of thought along with Sankhya, Vaisesika, etc., is not reasonable.  There are many books in circulation that discuss the six schools of Indian philosophy; Vedanta is included in these books as one of the schools.  This inclusion is not justified because, unlike a school of thought, Vedanta is not within the realm of speculation.   The subject matter of entire Veda is pramanantara-anadhigatam, one that various means of knowledge such as perception and inference have no access to.  There is no way to prove the existence of punya and papa.  So, too, one has epistemological access to areas such as heaven, rebirth, and the structure of a ritual and its connection to an end.  These areas fall outside the usual means of knowledge and therefore are not subject to any contentions.

From the nature of its subject matter, the Veda has to be looked upon as an independent means of knowledge (svatah-pramanam).  The Upanishads, forming the last portion of the Veda, also have a subject matter which is not available for sensory perception and inference.   Therefore, to label Vedanta as a school of thought only reveals a lack of understanding about the nature of its subject matter.

There are teachers (acharyas) who interpret the sentences of Vedanta (Vedanta-vakyas)  differently; but all these acharyas look upon Vedanta as a pramanam.  How valid are their interpretations?  The answer to this question will lead to an analysis (mimamsa) of the sentences of the various Upanishads.   In this analysis, we employ reasoning (yukti), grammar (vyakarana), and other factors that constitute hermeneutics.   By such inquiry (vichara) the vision (tatparya) of Vedanta will become clear.  Therefore, the interpretations of Ramanuja, Madhva, Vallabha and others who accept Vedanta as a means of knowledge cannot be considered schools of thought, but only as interpretations of Vedanta.

If Vedanta is a pramanam, then viewing it as such is what is called sraddha (trust in the validity of Vedanta pending knowledge).  To verify a means of knowledge, you do not require another means of knowledge.  The validity of a pramana rests in itself.  To know that my eyes see, I have to use my eyes and see.  To know Vedanta is a means of knowledge I have to expose myself dispassionately to Vedanta, with sraddha, and see what it unfolds is true.  If what Vedanta says is contradicted by any other means of knowledge, then the whole subject matter of Vedanta has to be dismissed as not valid or it has to be  looked into again.  One cannot say, "Because I see this man, he does not talk."  Seeing does not contradict hearing.  Similarly, my perception or inference about various things in the world does not in any way contradict the vision unfolded by Vedanta.

Excerpted from "The Teaching Tradition of Advaita Vedanta" by Swami Dayananda

Published: 07/16/98