manifold, for to Him are yoked ten organs, nay hundreds of them. He is the organs; He is ten, and thousands - many and infinite. That Brahman is without prior or posterior, without interior or exterior. This self, the perceiver of everything, is Brahman. This is the teaching.

इद्वे तन्माधित्यादि पूर्ववत। रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपः वभूव — रूपं रूपं प्रति प्रतिरूपः:
रूपान्तरं वभूवेत्यथः; प्रतिरूपोऽनुरूपो वा याहरस्तेस्थानो मातापितरो तत्स्थेस्थानः:
तदनुरूपं एव पुनः जायते; न हि चतुष्पदो दिपाजायते, द्विपदो वा चतुष्पदात; स एव हि
परमेश्वरो नामरूपे व्याकुलव्यः: रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपं वभूव। किमर्थ पुनः प्रतिरूपमागमनं
तस्येत्यत्व्यते — तत् अस्य आतमः: रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय प्रतिरूपायपायः; यदि हि नामरूपे
न व्याक्रियेते, तदा अस्य आतमो निरुपाधिकं रूपं प्रज्ञानवन्यं न प्रतिरूपायेत; यदा
पुनः कार्यकरणात्मना नामरूपे व्याकृतेऽवतः; तदा अस्य रूपं प्रतिरूपायेत। इद्दः
परमेश्वर: मायाभिः प्रज्ञाभिः: नामरूपभृतकृतमथार्थभिमानेवा न तु परमार्थः; पुरुषः
बहुरूपः; ईश्वरे गम्यते — एकरूपः एव प्रज्ञानधनः सनृ अविचारप्रज्ञाभिः। कस्मात् पुनः
कारणात्? युक्तः: रूपः इव वाजिनः; स्वविषयप्रकाशायनः हि यस्मात् अस्य हर्षः
हरणात् इन्द्रियायणः; शाता शताति, दशः च; प्राणिभेदंद्राहृत्यात् शतानि दशः च भवन्ति;
तस्मात् इन्द्रियविषयवाहुल्यात् तत्त्वकाशायं च युक्तानि तानि न आत्मप्रकाशायनात्
; ‘परा गृहेष्व शतानि व्यतृणस्वयम्भूः’ (क. उ. २।१।१) इति हि काठके। तस्मात् तैः
विषयस्वरूपेऽपि यथा, न प्रज्ञानाधनेकर्मणे स्वरूपने।

This is that meditation, etc.- is to be explained as before. (He) transformed Himself in accordance with each form, or (to put it differently) assumed the likeness of each form. A son has the same form as, or resembles, his parents. A quadruped is not born of bipeds, nor vice versa. The same Lord, in the process of manifesting name and form, 'transformed Himself in accordance with each form.' Why did He come in so many forms? That form of His was for the sake of making Him known.
Were name and form not manifested, the transcendent nature of this Self as Pure Intelligence would not be known. When, however, name and form are manifested as the body and organs, it is possible to know its nature. The Lord on account of Maya or diverse knowledge, or (to give an alternative meaning) the false identifications created by name, form and the elements, not in truth, is perceived as manifold, because of these notions superimposed by ignorance, although He is ever the same Pure Intelligence. Why? For to Him -are yoked, like horses to a chariot, ten organs-called 'Hari' because they draw -nay hundreds of them, for the purpose of revealing their objects; 'hundreds,' because there are a great many beings. Since there are a large number of sense-objects (the Supreme Self appears as manifold). It is to reveal them, and not the Self, that the organs are yoked. As the Katha Upanishad says, 'The self-born Lord injured the organs by making them outgoing in their tendencies' (IV. 1) - Therefore the Self is known not in its true nature as homogeneous Pure Intelligence, but merely as the sense-objects.

एवं तर्कः अन्यः: परसेष्ठरः: अन्ये हर्य इत्येवं द्वारे

Question: Then this Lord is one entity, and the organs another?

उच्चते — अर्थे वै हर्षोऽद्वै दश च सहस्राणि वृत्तिः चानत्तानि च ; प्राणिभेद्वस्य

आनन्त्यात। किं बहुना ? तदेतद्रक्ष य आत्मा, आपूर्वम् नास्य कारण पूर्व विद्यत इत्यद्वृत्तम्,

नास्यापरं कार्य विधत इत्यथपरम, नास्य जात्यन्तरमन्तरानि विधत इत्यंतरतरम्, तथा

बहिरस्य न विधत इत्यथाहम्; किं पुनस्ततः निरंतरं ब्रह्म? अयमात्मा; कोंसीः? यः प्रत्यगात्मा इत्यः, श्रोता मन्ता बोधा, विद्वाता सर्वानुमूः: — सर्वात्मान तत्त्वमुत्तत्ति

सर्वानुमूः: — इत्यैतनुसासनम् सर्वेदान्तोपदेशः; एष सर्वेदान्तानुसारसंहल्लोद्धर्थः;

एतद्मृतमभयम; परिसमात्त्रश्चाकारः: ||

Reply: No; He is the organs; he is ten and thousands-many and infinite—because there are an infinite number of beings. In short, that Brahman which is the self is without prior, i.e. cause, or posterior, i.e. effect, without interior or exterior, i.e. having no other species within It or without It. What is this homogeneous Brahman? This self. What is that? The inner self that sees, hears, thinks, understands, knows; the perceiver of everything, because as the self of all it perceives everything. This is the teaching of all Vedanta texts—the gist of them. It leads to immortality and fearlessness. The import of the scriptures has been fully dealt with.

|| इति द्वितीयायायस्य पचमं बाह्याम् ||

ArshaVidya.Org    July 7th to 21st, 2023
"जनको ह वैदेहः" इत्यादि याज्ञवल्क्यिय काण्डमार्गम्; उपपत्तिप्रधानत्वात् अतिकालान्ते मधुकाण्डेन समानार्थलेखपि सति न पुनरुत्तरः; मधुकाण्डे हि आगमप्रधानम्; आगमोपपत्ति हि आत्मकाव्यप्रकाशनाय सर्वत्रे शक्त: करतत्तत्तविल्लियि दर्शितम्; 'श्रोत्वयो मन्तव्यः' (बु. उ. २१४५) इति द्वृकम्; तस्मादामार्थस्येव परीक्षापूर्वके निर्धारणाय याज्ञवल्क्यिय काण्डमुपपतिप्रधानमार्गम्।

With 'Janaka, Emperor of Videha,' etc., the portion relating to Yājñavalkya begins. Though it treats of the same subject as the preceding one, viz. the Madhukānda, yet it is not a mere repetition, being mainly argumentative, whereas the preceding portion was mainly of the nature of scriptural testimony. When both scriptural evidence and argument start to demonstrate the unity of the Self, they can show it as clearly as a bael fruit on the palm of one's hand, for it has been said, '(The Self) should be heard of, reflected on,' etc. (II. iv. 5; IV. v. 6). Therefore it is to test the meaning of the Śrutis in the light of arguments that this portion relating to Yājñavalkya, which is mainly argumentative, is commenced.

आर्थ्यिका तु विज्ञानस्तुल्यं उपायविधिपरा वा; प्रसिद्धं हुपपयो विद्वद्धः शाखेषु च दृष्ट: — दानम्; दानेन हुपपमन्ते प्राणिः; प्रभूतं हिरण्यं गोसहस्रवानं च इहोपलम्; तस्मात् अन्यपरेणापि शाखेण विद्याप्राप्तयां दानप्रदर्शनार्थां आर्थ्यिका आर्थ्य।

अंि च तत्त्वसंयोगः: तेषः सह वादकरणं विद्याप्राप्तयों न्यायविधियों दृष्ट:; तच्च अर्थमधर्मयों प्रावत्येन प्रदर्शये; प्रतिष्ठा च विद्वंत्स्योंगे प्रज्ञावृद्धः। तस्मात्

विद्याप्राप्तयां प्रदर्शनार्थां आर्थ्यिका।

The story may be taken either as a eulogy on knowledge or as prescribing the way to acquire it; for it is a well-known fact, which scholars also notice in the scriptures, that the making of presents is one such way. Through presents people are won over; and here we see that plenty of gold and a thousand cows are presented. Therefore, though this section has another main purpose, the story is introduced to show that the making of presents is a way to the acquisition of knowledge. Another customary way of acquiring it, as observed in the system of
logic, is the association with adepts in that line, and discussion with them; that
too is amply shown in this chapter. And it is a common experience that association
with scholars adds to our knowledge. Therefore we must conclude that the story
is meant to point out the way to acquire knowledge.

Om. Janaka, Emperor of Videha, performed a sacrifice in
which gifts were freely distributed. Vedic scholars from
Kuru and Pañcāla were assembled there. Emperor Janaka
of Videha had a desire to know, ‘Which is the most erudite
of these Vedic scholars?’ He had a thousand cows confined
in a pen, and on the horns of each cow were fixed ten
Pādas\textsuperscript{11} (of gold).

\textsuperscript{11} A Pāda is about one-third of an ounce.

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There was a ruler of Videha named Janaka, who was an Emperor. He performed a sacrifice in which gifts were freely distributed. Or the sacrifice itself may have had that name (Bahu-dakṣiṇa), referred to elsewhere in the Vedas. Or the horse sacrifice may here be so called because of the abundance of gifts in it. Vedic scholars from Kuru and Pañcāla—which are famous for their large number of scholars—were assembled in that sacrifice, either on invitation or as spectators. Seeing that large assembly of scholars, Emperor Janaka of Videha, the sacrificer, had a desire to know which was the greatest Vedic scholar among them. He thought like this: 'Which is the most erudite of these Vedic scholars? They are all versed in the Vedas, but which is the greatest of them?' Being desirous of knowing this, he, as a means to finding it out, had a thousand young cows confined in a pen. The cows are being described. On the horns of each cow were fixed ten Pādas—a Pāda being a quarter of a Pala—of gold, five on each horn.

He said to them, 'Revered Brāhmaṇas, let him who is the best Vedic scholar among you drive these cows (home).'
None of the Brāhmaṇas dared. Then Yājñavalkya said to a pupil of his, 'Dear Sāmaśravas, please drive these cows (home).’ He drove them. The Brāhmaṇas were enraged.

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July 7th to 21st, 2023
‘How does he dare to call himself the best Vedic scholar among us?’ There was a Hotṛ of Emperor Janaka of Videha named Aśvala. He now asked Yājñavalkya, ‘Yājñavalkya, are you indeed the best Vedic scholar among us?’ Yājñavalkya replied, ‘I bow to the best Vedic scholar, I just want the cows.’ Thereupon the Hotṛ Aśvala determined to interrogate him.

गा एवम्ब्रह्मणा स्तान्योऽहोरोच, हे ब्रह्मणा भगवन्त: इत्यामच्छ: — य: व: युष्माके

10 ब्रह्मण: — सर्वे यूथे ब्रह्मण:, अतिरिक्तेऽयुष्माके ब्रह्मण: यः — स: एता गा उद्दयताम्

उत्कालिनः स्वमृ प्रति। ते ह ब्रह्मणा न दधुपुष्: — ते ह किल प्रवक्ता ब्रह्मणा:

12 ब्रह्मिष्टात्मात्मन: प्रतिज्ञाताऽन् दधुपुष: न प्रगङ्ग: सवृत्त:। अप्रगङ्गः भूतेऽथ ब्रह्मणेऽपथं

ह याज्ञवल्क्य: स्वमृ आत्मायमेव ब्रह्मचारिणाम् अन्तेवासिनम् उवाच — एता: गा: हे

14 सोमस पुष्य उद्दय अस्मादृह्मान्ति, हे सामश्रवः — सामविच्छ्व हि श्रणोति, अतः

अर्थां चुर्ये दो याज्ञवल्क्यः। ता: गा: ह उदाचकार उत्कालिनाचार्यमृ प्रति।

16 याज्ञवल्क्येन ब्रह्मिष्टायं वस्त्रयाकरणेन आत्मोऽन्तर्विता प्रतिज्ञातेति ते ह चुक्रुपः

कुद्रवन्तो ब्रह्मणा:। तेषां कोधाभिमानपासि — कथं न: अस्माकम् एकप्राप्तहानां

18 ब्रह्मिष्टोहस्वमिति बुवीतेति। अथ ह एवं कुद्रुप ब्रह्मणेऽप जनकस्य जयमानस्य होताः

अध्वर्त्क अभलो नम्ब्रभुव आतिसात्। स एते याज्ञवल्क्यम् — ब्रह्मिष्टाभिमानी

20 राजाध्युत्वाच भृत्: — याज्ञवल्क्यं पश्रया पुष्डतवान्; कथम? ते नु खलु नो याज्ञवल्क्य

ब्रह्मिष्टोहस्ते श्री इति — ज्ञति: भर्तर् आतिसात्। स होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः — नमस्कृमः कर्म

22 ब्रह्मिष्टाय, इद्धिति गोकामा: समो वयमिति। ते ब्रह्मिष्टायं सत्ते तत्व एव

ब्रह्मिष्ट्यण्वंस्वीकरणात् प्रधुं दृष्ट्य पृथवान्ध्रमो होताः अभिल:।

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12 A priest who has the duty of invoking the gods in a sacrifice, reciting from the Rg-Veda.

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July 7th to 21st, 2023
Having the cows thus confined, he said addressing those Brāhmaṇas, ‘Revered Brāhmaṇas, you are all Vedic scholars; let him who is specially so among you drive these cows home.’ None of the Brāhmaṇas thus addressed dared to announce his surpassing Vedic scholarship. When they were thus silenced, Yājñavalkya said to a pupil of his, ‘Dear Sāmaśravas, please drive these cows home.’ ‘Sāmaśravas means one who learns how to chant the Śāman. Hence by implication Yājñavalkya is made out to be versed in all the four Vedas.’ He drove the cows towards his teacher’s home. Yājñavalkya, by accepting the prize meant for the best Vedic scholar, indirectly declared himself as such; so the Brāhmaṇas were enraged. The reason for their anger is being stated: How does he dare to call himself the best Vedic scholar among us who are each a great scholar? Among the Brāhmaṇas thus enraged, there was a Hotr of Janaka, the sacrificer, named Aśvala. He prided himself upon being the greatest Vedic scholar, and was insolent owing to royal patronage. So he challenged Yājñavalkya as follows: ‘Yājñavalkya, are you indeed the best Vedic scholar among us?’ The prolonged accent (in the verb) signifies censure. Yājñavalkya replied: ‘I bow to the best Vedic scholar, now I just want the cows’ Thereupon, i.e. when he accepted the prize meant for the best Vedic scholar and thereby declared himself to be one, the Hotr Aśvala determined to interrogate him.

‘Yājñavalkya,’ said he, ‘since all this is overtaken by death, and swayed by it, by what means does the sacrificer go beyond the clutches of death?’ ‘Through the organ of speech-through fire, which is the (real) priest called Hotr. The sacrificer’s organ of speech is the Hotr. This organ of speech is fire; this fire is the Hotr; this (fire) is liberation; this (liberation) is emancipation.

13 The grounds are as follows: He is principally a teacher of the Yajur-veda; the pupil in question learns from him how to chant the Śāman, which is the Rg set to music, so he must also know these two Vedas; and the Atharva-Veda is subsidiary to the other three.
Yājñavalkya, said he. In the section on the Udgītha (I. iii.) comprised in the Madhukāṇḍa it has been briefly explained how a sacrificer can escape death through the rite with five factors coupled with the meditation about it. The present section being an examination of that, a rather detailed treatment is being given here in order to introduce some particulars about that meditation. "Since all this, the accessories of this rite, such as the priests and the fire, is overtaken by death, i.e. by ritualistic work attended with our natural attachment—not only overtaken, but also swayed by death, by what means, or meditation, does the sacrificer go beyond the clutches of death, become independent of it?"

Objection: Has it not already been said in the section on the Udgītha that he transcends death by identifying himself with the vital force in the mouth?

Reply: Yes, but the particulars that have been omitted there will be given here. So there is nothing wrong in it.

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Yājñavalkya said, ‘Through the organ of speech-through fire, which is the (real) priest called Hotṛ.’ The explanation follows. Who is that Hotṛ through whom the sacrificer transcends death? ‘The sacrificer’s organ of speech is the Hotṛ.’ ‘Sacrifice’ here means the sacrificer. Witness the Śruti, ‘The sacrifice is the sacrificer’ (Ś. XIV. II. ii. 24). The sacrificer’s organ of speech is the Hotṛ with reference to sacrifices. How? This organ of speech of the sacrificer is the well-known fire, with reference to the gods. This has already been explained under the topic of the three kinds of food (I. v. 11). And that fire is the Hotṛ, for the Śruti says, ‘Fire is the Hotṛ’ (Ś. VI. iv. ii. 6). These two auxiliaries of a sacrifice, viz. the priest called Hotṛ with reference to sacrifices, and the organ of speech with reference to the body, being limited, are ‘overtaken by death,’ i.e. are continually changed by ritualistic work directed by our natural attachment due to ignorance, and are therefore ‘swayed by death.’ If the sacrificer looks upon them as fire, their divine form, it conduces to his\textsuperscript{14} liberation from death.

\textsuperscript{14} As also the Hotṛ’s.
So the text says: *This is liberation*, i.e. the Hotṛ who is fire is liberation. In other words, looking upon the Hotṛ as fire is that. As soon as the sacrificer looks upon the two accessories as fire, he is freed from death consisting in his limited natural attachment relating to the body and the elements. Therefore that Hotṛ, when looked upon as fire, is ‘liberation,’ i.e. the means of liberation, for the sacrificer. *This is emancipation:* That which is liberation is emancipation, i.e. a means to it. To look upon those two limited accessories as fire, which is their unlimited divine form, is liberation. This liberation which consists in looking upon (the Hotṛ and the organ of speech) in their divine aspect is also spoken of as the resulting emancipation—becoming one with fire, their divine form—which takes one beyond the death that consists in attachment to limitations relating to the body and the elements. It is called emancipation, because that liberation itself is a means to it. It has already been explained in the section on the Udgītha that the identification of the organ of speech etc. with fire and so on is itself the emancipation of the sacrificer. There it has been said in a general way that identity with the vital force in the mouth is the means of liberation, but the particulars have not been given. Here some details, viz. the viewing of the organ of speech etc. as fire and so on, are given. The emancipation from death here dealt with is the same as that which has been described as a result in the section on the Udgītha in the words, ‘(That fire) having transcended death shines,’ etc. (I. iii. 12).
It has been stated that a man under the control of the organs and objects (Grahas and Atigrahas), which are themselves directed by his merits and demerits, repeatedly takes up and discards the organs and objects, and transmigrates. And the perfection of merits has been explained as being concerned with the manifested universe, collective and individual being the identification with Hiranyagarbha in both those aspects. Now the question arises as to whether the entity that transmigrates under the control of the organs and objects exists or does not exist: and if it exists, what it is like. So it is to teach about the Self as a distinct entity that the question of Uṣasta is introduced. If one knows That as unconditioned, naturally free from action and its factors, one is freed from the above-mentioned bondage together with its stimulating causes. The purpose of the story is already known.
Then Uṣasta, the son of Cakra, asked him. ‘Yājñavalkya,’ said he, ‘explain to me the Brahman that is immediate and direct the self that is within all.’ ‘This is your self that is within all.’ ‘Which is within all, Yājñavalkya?’ ‘That which breathes through the Pṛāṇa is your self that is within all. That which moves downwards through the Āpāna is your self that is within all. That which pervades through the Vyāna is your self that is within all. That which goes out through the Udāna is your self that is within all. This is your self that is within all.’

14 अथ ह प्रकृते याज्ञवल्क्यम्, उपस्तो नामतः, चक्स्यापत्यं चाकायणं, प्रच्छ। यत्
बह्य साक्षात् अव्यवहितं केनचित् दृढः: अपरोक्षात् — अगौणम् — न श्रोतवह्दादिवत्।
16 — कि तत्? य आत्मा — आत्मशब्देन प्रत्यगात्मोच्चते, तत्र आत्मशब्दस्य प्रसिद्धैन् आत्मा बह्दौति — तम्
आत्मानम्, मे महृदम, व्याच्यवेति — विस्फोट श्रृंगृहीत्वा यथा गां दर्श्यति तथा 
आच्छाद, सोषयमित्येवं कथयस्वेत्यर्थ:।

Then Uṣasta, the son of Cakra, asked him, ‘Yājñavalkya,’ who has already been introduced. The Brahman that is immediate, not obstructed from the seer or subject by anything, and direct, not used in a figurative sense, like the ear and so forth, which are considered to be Brahman. What is that? The self that is within all. The word ‘self’ refers to the inner (individual) self, that being the accepted meaning of the term. The words ‘Yat’ and ‘Yah’15 indicate that the self familiar to all is identical with Brahman. Explain that self to me, speak about it clearly, as one shows a cow by taking hold of its horns, as much as to say, ‘This is it.’

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15 Neuter and masculine forms of the Sanskrit word meaning ‘that’.
Thus addressed, Yājñavalkya replied, ‘This is your self that is within all.’ The qualification ‘that is within all’ is suggestive of all qualifications whatsoever. That which is ‘immediate’ or unobstructed, and ‘direct’ or used in its primary sense, and which is ‘Brahman or the vastest, the self of all and within all—all these specifications refer to the self. ‘What is that?’; ‘This self of yours? that by which your body and organs are ensouled is your self, i.e. the self of the body and organs.’ ‘There is first the body; within it is the subtle body consisting of the organs; and the third is that whose existence is being doubted. Which of these do you mean as my self that is within all?’ Thus spoken to, Yājñavalkya said, ‘That which breathes (lit. does the function of the Prāṇa) through the Prāṇa, which operates in the mouth and nose, in other words, “which makes the Prāṇa breathe” (Ke. I. 9), is your self i.e. the individual self of the body and organs.’ The rest is similar in meaning. That which moves downwards through the Apāṇa, which pervades through the Vyāṇa the long i in the two verbs is a Vedic licence by which the body
and organs are made to breathe and do other functions, like a wooden puppet. Unless they are operated by an intelligent principle, they cannot do any function such as breathing, as is the case with the wooden puppet. Therefore it is on account of being operated by the individual self, which is distinct from them, that they breathe and do other functions, as does the puppet. Hence that principle distinct from the body and organs exists which makes them function.

उषास्त, the son of Cakra, said, ‘You have indicated it as one may say that a cow is such and such, or a horse is such and such. Explain to me the Brahman that is immediate and direct the self that is within all.’ ‘This is your self that is within all.’ ‘Which is within all, Yājñavalkya?’ ‘You cannot see that which is the witness of vision; you cannot hear that which is the hearer of hearing; you cannot think that which is the thinker of thought; you cannot know that which is the knower of knowledge. This is your self that is within all; everything else but this is perishable.’ Thereupon Uṣasta, the son of Cakra, kept silent.

र त्यो कर्मवर्क्ष्ययो दानव्यथा प्रतिज्ञाय पूर्वम्, पुरविन्प्रतिप्पल्लो बुद्धाद्वथा — असो गौं: असावश्व: यश्वूलति धारतीति वा, पूर्व प्रत्यक्षो दर्श्यामिति प्रतिज्ञाय, पश्चात्त चलनातिदिग्‌व्यप्दिशाति — एवंेव पूर्वो ाणार्दिन्यदिग्व्यप्दिश्ये भवति तथा; कि भवुना? त्यत्त्वा गोनुण्णानिति त्वाज्ञम्, यदेव साक्षाद्परमार्ज्ज्या य
आत्मा सर्वार्थः, त मे व्याच्यति। इतर आह — यथा मया प्रथम प्रतिज्ञात: तव
आत्मा — एवंक्षणै इति — तां प्रतिज्ञामूलवर्ते एव; ततु तथैव, यथोऽकार मया।

Uṣasta, the son of Cakra, said: As somebody first proposes one thing and then,
being in doubt, may say something else—for instance, having proposed to point out
a cow or a horse, he merely describes them through certain characteristics of theirs,
such as walking and says, 'A cow is that which walks,' or 'A horse is that which
runs.' so you too have indicated Brahman through certain characteristics such as
breathing. To be brief, give up your trick prompted by your hankering after the
cows, and explain to me the Brahman that is immediate and direct the self that is within
all. Yājñavalkya replied: I adhere to the proposition that I first made, that your
self is such and such; it is exactly as I have described it.

रत्नुनरक्तम्, तमात्मानं घटादिवत्, विषयीकृतिः — ततु अशक्तवान्ति किष्यते।
कस्मात्पुन: तदशक्मित्याह — वस्तुस्वाभावाय; किं पुनः ततु वस्तुस्वाभावायम्?
द्व्यादिद्वृत्तम्; द्वेदेशा धातमा; विरितिरितिः विविधा भवति — लौकिकी पारमार्थिकी
चेति; तत्र लौकिकी चक्षुः संयुक्तान्: करणवृत्ताः; सा किष्यत इति जायते विन्याति
च; या तु आत्मनो दशिः अभयुण्णप्रकाशादिवत्, सा च दशुः स्वरूपत्वात्, न
जायते न विन्याति च; सा नियमाण्या उपाधिभूतम् संयुक्तेवेति, व्यपदिष्टते —
दशैति, भेदक्च; दशु दशैरिती च; यासौ लौकिकी दशिः च: चक्षुः रूपोपरका
जायमानेव नित्याः आत्मदशु न संस्कृतेव, तत्वतिच्छाया — तथा व्यासेव जायते,
तथा विन्याति च; तेन उपचार्यते दशु सदा पद्यक्रिपः — पश्यति न पश्यति
चेति; न तु पुनः दशैरिते: कदाचिद्वयन्याधातमः; तथास वश्यति षडः — 'व्यायतीव
लेल्लायतीव' (बृ.उ.४१.३१), 'न हि दशैरितेर्विरितोऽपि विच्यते' (बृ.उ.४१.४२३)
इति च।

You asked me to present the self as one would a jar etc. I do not do so,
because it is impossible. Why is it impossible? Owing to the very nature of the
thing. What is that? Its being the witness of vision etc., for the self is the witness of vision. Vision is of two kinds, ordinary and real. Ordinary vision is a function of the mind as connected with the eye; it is an act, and as such it has a beginning and an end. But the vision that belongs to the self is like the heat and light of fire; being the very essence of the witness, it has neither beginning nor end.

Because it appears to be connected with the ordinary vision, which is produced and is but a limiting adjunct of it, it is spoken of as the witness, and also as differentiated into witness and vision. The ordinary vision, however, is colored by the objects seen through the eye, and of course has a beginning; it appears to be connected with the eternal vision of the self, and is but its reflection; it originates and ends, pervaded by the other. It is therefore that the eternal vision of the self is metaphorically spoken of as the witness, and although eternally seeing, is spoken of as sometimes seeing and sometimes not seeing. But as a matter of fact the vision of the seer never changes. So it will be said in the fourth chapter, ‘It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were’ (IV. iii. 7), and ‘The vision of the witness can never be lost’ (IV. iii. 23).

This is the meaning of the following passage: You cannot see that which is the witness of vision, i.e. which pervades by its eternal vision the act of our ordinary vision. This latter, which is an act, is affected by the objects seen, and reveals only colour (form), but not the inner self that pervades it. Therefore you cannot see that inner self which is the witness of vision. Similarly you cannot hear that which is the hearer of hearing; you cannot think that which pervades thought, the mere function of the mind; you cannot know that which pervades knowledge, the mere function of the intellect. This is the very nature of the thing; therefore it cannot be shown like a cow etc.
Some¹⁶ explain the passage, ‘You cannot see the witness of vision,’ etc. differently. According to them ‘the witness of vision’ means ‘that which sees,’ the agent or cause of vision in general, without any distinction of kind. In other words, they regard the genitive case in the term ‘of vision’ as having an objective/accusative force. That vision is caused and is an effect, like a jar. The suffix in the word ‘Draṣṭṛ’ (witness) indicates agency. Therefore, these commentators opine, the expression ‘the witness of vision’ means ‘the agent of vision.’ But they fail to see that the words ‘of vision’ then become redundant; or even if they see it, they take it as a repetition, or as a faulty reading not worth anything, and pay no attention to it. How are the words redundant? They are redundant, because the word ‘Draṣṭṛ’ itself would be enough to indicate the agency of vision; then one should only say, ‘You cannot see the witness.’ For the text uses the suffix ‘trc’ with the verb, and in grammar this always indicates agency of the act denoted by the verb. We only say, ‘One is conducting the traveler or the cutter;’ we should not, in the absence of any special meaning, say, ‘the traveler of travelling, or ‘the cutter of cutting.’ Nor should the extra words be dismissed as a mere elucidation, if there is any alternative explanation; and it is not a faulty

¹⁶ The reference is to Bhartṛprapāṇa.

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July 7ᵗʰ to 21ˢᵗ, 2023
reading, since all\(^{17}\) unanimously accept it. Therefore it is a defect of the
commentators’ understanding and not a mistake on the part of the students.

But the way we have explained it, viz. that the self endowed with eternal
vision, as opposed to the ordinary vision, should be pointed out, accounts for the
two words ‘witness’ and ‘vision’ (in the expression ‘the witness of vision’) as
describing the subject and the object, with a view to defining the nature of the
self. It will also agree with the passage, ‘The vision of the witness (can never be
lost)’ etc. (IV. iii. 23), occurring elsewhere, as also with the clauses, ‘(Through
which) the eyes see’ (Ke. I. 7), ‘(By which) this ear is heard’ (Ke. I. 8), occurring
in another text. It is also consonant with reason. In other words, the self can be
eternal if only it is immutable; it is a contradiction in terms to say that a thing is
changeable and yet eternal. Moreover, the Śruti texts, ‘It thinks, as it were, and
shakes, as it were’ (IV. iii. 22), ‘The vision of the witness can never be lost,’ and
‘This is the eternal glory of a knower of Brahman’ (IV. iv. 23), would otherwise
be inconsistent.

\(^{17}\) Students of both Kātyā and Madhyandina recensions.
Objection: But such terms as ‘witness,’ ‘hearer,’ ‘thinker’ and ‘knower’ would also be inconsistent if the self is immutable.

Reply: Not so, for they only repeat conventional expressions as people think them. They do not seek to define the truth of the self. Since the expressions ‘the witness of vision’ etc. cannot otherwise be explained, we conclude that they mean what we have indicated. Therefore the opponents’ rejection of the qualifying term ‘of vision’ is due only to ignorance. This is your self specified by all those above-mentioned epithets. Everything else but this self, whether it is the gross body or the subtle body consisting of the organs, is perishable. This only is imperishable, changeless. Thereupon Uśasta, the son of Cakra, kept silent.

इति तृतीयाध्यायस्य चतुर्थं ब्राह्मणं॥
Bondage with its stimulating causes has been spoken of. The existence of that which is bound, as also its distinctness from the body etc., has also been known. Now the knowledge of the Self together with renunciation, which is the means of liberating it from that bondage, have to be described. Hence the question of Kahola is introduced.

Then Kahola, the son of Kuṣṭaka, asked him. ‘Yājñavalkya,’ said he, ‘explain to me the Brahman that is immediate and direct the self that is within all.’ ‘This is your self that is within all.’ ‘Which is within all, Yājñavalkya?’ ‘That which transcends hunger and thirst, grief, delusion, decay and death. Knowing this very Self
the Brähmanas renounce the desire for sons, for wealth and for the worlds, and lead a mendicant’s life. That which is the desire for sons is the desire for wealth, and that which is the desire for wealth is the desire for the worlds, for both these are but desires. Therefore the knower of Brahman, having known all about scholarship, should try to live upon that strength which comes of knowledge; having known all about this strength as well as scholarship, he becomes meditative; having known all about both meditative and its opposite, he becomes a knower of Brahman. How does that knower of Brahman behave? Howsoever he may behave, he is just such. Except this everything is perishable.’ Thereupon Kahola, the son of Kuṣītaka, kept silent.

Then Kahola, the son of Kuṣītaka, asked him, ‘Yājñavalkya’, said he to be explained as before ‘explain to me the Brahman that is immediate and direct-the self that is within all,’ knowing which one is freed from bondage. Yājñavalkya said, ‘This is your self.’

Question: Do Uṣasta and Kahola ask about one and the same self, or do they ask of different selves having similar characteristics?
Some say: It ought to be different selves, for then only can the two
questions be other than a repetition. Had Usasta and Kahola asked about the same
self, then one question having dealt with that, the second would have been
redundant; and the passage in question is not a mere elucidation. Therefore the
two selves must be different, viz. the individual self and the Supreme Self.

Reply: No, because of the use of the word 'your.' It has been said in the
reply, 'This is your self' (III. iv. 1-2; this text), and the same aggregate of body
and organs cannot have two selves, for each aggregate possesses a single self. Nor
can Usasta and Kahola mean selves essentially different from each other, since
both cannot be primary, and self and within all. If one of the two be Brahman in
a primary sense, the other must be secondary; similarly with selfhood and being
within all, for these three terms are contradictory. If one of the two Brahmans be
the self, primary, and within all, then the other must be non-self, secondary, and
not within all. Therefore one and the same self has been mentioned twice with a
view to telling something special about it. That part only of the second question
which is common to the first is a repetition of the latter, and the second question
is introduced in order to furnish some detail not mentioned before.

18 The reference is to Bhartṛprapāñca.
Objection: What is this detail?

Reply: It is this. In the first question it has been stated that there is a self distinct from the body, whose bondage together with its stimulating causes has been spoken of: but in the second something more is added, viz. that this self is beyond relative attributes such as hunger a detail, by knowing which, together with renunciation, one is freed from the bondage above spoken of. Therefore we conclude that in both cases the question and answer, ending with the words, ‘This is your self that is within all,’ have an identical meaning.

Objection: How can the same self possess contradictory attributes, such as being beyond hunger etc. and having them?

Reply: The objection is not valid, having already been refuted (II.i.20 of this text). We have repeatedly said that the relative existence of the self is but a delusion caused by its association with limiting adjuncts, such as the body and organs, which are but the modifications of name and form. We have also made
this clear while explaining the apparently contradictory passages of the Śrutas (II.v.15 of this text). For instance, a rope, a mother-of-pearl, or the sky, becomes a snake, silver or blue respectively, owing to attributes imputed by people, but in themselves they are just a rope, a mother-of-pearl, or the sky. Thus there is no contradiction if things possess contradictory attributes.

नामरूपोपाध्यसिल्वे ‘एकमेवाविद्वितीयम्’ (छ.उ.६१२१) ‘नेह नानासिति किन्न’

(बृ.उ.४१४१९) इति श्रुत्त्यो विरुध्येकस्त्रिति चेतः —

Objection: Will not such Upaniṣadic texts as, ‘One only without a second’ (Ch. VI. ii. 1), and ‘There is no difference whatsoever in It’ (IV. iv. 19; Ka. IV. 11), be contradicted if you admit the existence of the limiting adjuncts, name and form?

न, सातिलांकण्यानेन परिहितत्वात् मृदाविद्यान्तिन्द्रः; यदा तु परमात्माया

परमात्मत्तचात् श्रुत्त्युसारिण्यं अन्तवलेन निरूप्यमाणेन नामस्ये मृदाविद्याकः

वस्तुनिर्दृश्ये तत्कथो न स्थः — सातिलांकण्यायदिविविकारवेद, तदा तत्त्वात् अपेक्षे

‘एकमेवाविद्वितीयम्’ (छ.उ.६१२१) ‘नेह नानासिति किन्न’ (बृ.उ.४१४१९)

इत्यादिपरमात्मदर्शनंगोचरल्व प्रतिपद्धते; यदा तु स्वाभाविकविविध्या बहस्तःरूपः

रजुशुचिकागगनस्वरूपवेदेव स्वेत रूपेन वर्तमानं केनचिदंश्वरभावमपि सतं

नामरूपकृतकार्यकरणोपाधिक्षम्यो विवेकेन्न नायथायते, नामरूपोपाधिक्षितं च भवति

स्वाभाविकी, तदा सर्वावं वस्तुप्रकारसितविवध्वहारः। असित चाचयं भेदकृतो

मिथ्याविवध्वहाः, येषो बहस्तवाद्यत्वेव वस्तुं विद्यते, येषों च नासितः;

परमात्मादिविभिन्नुं श्रुत्त्युसारेण निरूप्यमाणेन वस्तुतुति — किं तत्त्वोपसिति वस्तुं कि

वा नासितीति, बहस्वैकेवाविद्वितीयं सर्वस्वविवध्वहरशून्यामिति निर्यायेयते; तेन न

कष्टविद्विरोधः। न हि परमार्थचार्याणिन्द्रायं वस्तुप्रकारसितमवं प्रतिपद्यामहे —

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Reply: No; this has already been refuted by the illustrations of the foam of water and (the modifications of) clay etc. But when name and form are tested from the standpoint of the highest truth in the light of the above Śruti texts, as to whether they are different from the Supreme Self or not, they cease to be separate entities, like the foam of water, or like the modifications (of clay) such as a jar. It is then that such passages as, ‘One only without a second,’ and ‘There is no difference whatsoever in It,’ have scope from the standpoint of the Supreme Self as referring to the highest realisation. But when on account of our primordial ignorance, the reality of Brahman, although remaining as it is, naturally untouched by anything-like the reality of the rope, the mother-of-pearl and the sky is not discriminated from the limiting adjuncts such as the body and organs, which are created by name and form, and our natural vision of those adjuncts remains, then this phenomenal existence consisting of things different from Brahman has full play. This unreal, phenomenal existence created by differentiation is indeed a fact for those who do not believe in things as different from Brahman as well as for those who do believe. But the believers of the highest truth, while discussing in accordance with the Śrutis, the actual existence or non-existence of things apart from Brahman, conclude that Brahman alone is the one without a second, beyond all finite relations. So there is no contradiction between the two views. We do not maintain the existence of things different from Brahman in the state when the highest truth has been definitely known, as the Śrutis say, ‘One only without a second,’ and ‘Without interior or exterior’ (II. v. 19; III. viii. 8). Nor do we deny the validity, for the ignorant, of actions with their factors and results while the relative world of name and form exists. Therefore scriptural or conventional outlook depends entirely on knowledge or ignorance. Hence there is no apprehension of a contradiction between them. In fact, all schools must admit the existence or non-existence of the phenomenal world according as it is viewed from the relative or the absolute standpoint.
Regarding the nature of the self as it is in reality, once more the question is asked: ‘Which is within all, Yājñavalkya?’ The other replied, ‘That which transcends hunger and thirst’. The word ‘which’ in the text should be construed with ‘transcends’ coming shortly after. As the sky, fancied by the ignorant as being concave and blue, is really without these qualities, being naturally untouched by them, similarly Brahman, although fancied as being subject to hunger, thirst, etc., by the ignorant, who think that they are hungry or thirsty, really transcends these qualities, being naturally untouched by them, for the Śruti says, ‘It is not affected by human misery, being beyond it’(Ka. V. 11) i.e. by misery attributed by ignorant people. Hunger and thirst have been compounded in the text, as both are vital functions.

शोक मोहम् — शोक इति कामः; इत्य वस्तु उदिष्य चिन्तयतो चतुर्माणम्,
तत् तुणाभिभूतस्य कामवीजम्; तेन हि कामो दीप्यते; मोहस्तु
विपरीतप्रभमबोधिवेकः भ्रमः; स च अविद्या सर्वस्यानात्सर्वम् प्रसवबीजम;
भिन्नकर्मवाच्यत्यो: शोकमोहयो: असमास्थकरणाः। तौ मनोदिकरणो; तथा
शरीराधिकरणो जरां मृत्युं च अत्यति; जरेति कार्यकरणस्वाहातविपरिणामः
वल्लभाेतादिरिजः; मृत्युरुपः तद्विद्धे: विपरिणामावसानः; तौ जरामृत्युः
Grief is desire. The discomfort that one feels as one reflects on some
covetable thing is the seed of desire for one afflicted with a hankering, because it
kindles desire; while delusion is a mistake, a confusion, arising from a false notion;
it is ignorance, the fruitful source of all troubles. The two words are not
compounded, as grief and delusion produce different results. They have their seat
in the mind. (The self also transcends) decay and death, which centre in the body.
‘Decay’ is that modification of the body and organs which is marked by wrinkles,
grey hair, etc. ‘Death’ is the fall of the body, the last modification to overtake it.
These, the hunger and the rest, which centre in the vital force, mind and body,
and are present in beings in an unbroken succession like days and nights, etc.,
and like the waves of an ocean, are called the relative or transmigratory existence
with regard to them. But that which is described as the witness of vision and so
forth, which is immediate or unobstructed and direct or used in a primary sense,
which is within all, and is the self of all beings from Hiranyagarbha down to a
clump of grass, is ever untouched by such relative attributes as hunger and thirst,
as the sky is untouched by impurities like the clouds etc.
Knowing this very Self, their own reality, as 'I am this, the Supreme Brahman, eternally devoid of relative attributes, and ever satisfied,' the Brāhmaṇas—they are mentioned because they alone are qualified for renunciation renounce, lit. rise up in an opposite direction to what? the desire for sons, as means to winning this world, thinking, 'We will win this world through sons'- in other words, marriage; hence the meaning is, they do not marry. (The desire) for wealth: procuring cattle etc., which are the means of rites, in order that one may perform rites through them and win the world of the Manes, or that one may win the world of the gods either by combining rites with meditation, which is divine wealth, or solely through meditation on Hiranyagarbha. Some say that one cannot renounce divine wealth, since it is through this that renunciation is possible. But this view is wrong, for divine wealth also falls within the category of desires, as we know from the Śruti passage, 'This much indeed is desire' (I. iv. 17). It is the meditation on the gods such as Hiranyagarbha which is spoken of as wealth, because it leads to the world of the gods. The knowledge of Brahman, which concerns the unconditioned Pure Intelligence, cannot certainly be the means of attaining the world of the gods. Witness the Śruti texts. 'Therefore It became all' (I. iv. 10), and 'For he becomes their self' (Ibid.). It is through the knowledge of Brahman that renunciation takes place, for there is the specific statement, 'Knowing this very Self.' Therefore they renounce all these three objects of desire which lead to worlds that are not the Self. 'Eṣāṇā' means desire, for the Śruti says, 'This much indeed is desire.' That
is to say, they cease to hanker after all this threefold means of attaining worlds that are not the Self.

सर्वा हि साधनेच्छा फलेच्छाव, अतो व्यञ्जने श्रुति: — एकेव एषणेति; कथम? या खेव पुष्पाणि सा विशेषणा, दशसाधनवनवन्त्यत्वात्: या विशेषणा सा लोकेशणा; फलार्थेव सा; सर्व: फलार्थस्तुक एव हि सर्व साधनमुपाद्ते; अत एकेव एषणा या लोकेशणा सा साधनमन्त्रण सम्यादितुं न शक्तति इति, साध्वसाधनमेवं उभे हि यस्मात् एते एषणा एव भवतः। तस्मात् प्राध्विदो नार्तिक कर्म कर्मसाधनं वा — अतो चेतिकान्ता ब्राह्मणः, सर्व कर्म कर्मसाधनं च सर्व देवप्रमाणानुमनिन्ति यज्ञोपवित्तादि — तेन हि देवेन पित्रत्व मानुष्य च कर्म कियते,

‘निवीतं मनुष्यायाम्’ (तै. सं. २५१५।११। १) इत्यादिश्रुते:। तस्मात् पूर्व ब्राह्मणः प्राध्विद: व्युत्थाय कर्मं: कर्मसाधनमेवः यज्ञोपवित्रादिः; भर्महंसपारिवर्त्ये प्रतिपध, भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति — भिक्षार्थं चरणं भिक्षाचर्य्यम्, चरन्ति — त्यत्वा स्मार्त खिं केवलात्मकमात्रावर्षानां जीवनसाधनं पारिवर्त्यवज्रक:। विद्वान् विज्ञवर्जित: — ‘तस्मादलिङ्गो धर्मज्ञो व्यवक्तिमोक्षव्यक्तवाचारः’ (अथ. ४६।५१) (व. १०।१२) इत्यादिस्वृत्तिः, ‘अथ परिवाक्षवर्षागता मुण्डोपरियस्मात्’ (ज्ञ. उ. ५)

इत्यादिश्रुते, ‘सिद्धान्तवाचित्रकृत्यं विसृज्य यज्ञोपवित्रत्’ (क. रू. १) इति च।।

Every desire for means is a desire for results; therefore the text says that desire is one. How? That which is the desire for sons is he desire for wealth, for both are equally means to tangible results. And that which is the desire for wealth is the desire for the worlds, for it is directed towards results. People adopt different means, actuated by the desire for results. Hence desire is one, because the desire for the worlds cannot be attained without the requisite means, for both these are but desires, one being but a means to the other. Therefore the knower of Brahma has nothing to do with rites or their accessories. ‘Brāhmaṇas’ in the text means those of past times. The rites and their accessories here spoken of refer to the holy thread etc., which are means to the performance of rites pertaining to the gods, the manes and
मन, for through them these rites are performed. Compare the Śruti, ‘The holy thread that hangs straight down from the neck is for rites pertaining to men’ (Tait. S. II. v. ii. 1). Therefore the ancient Brāhmaṇas—knowers of Brahman renouncing rites and their accessories, such as the holy thread, embrace the life of a monk (of the highest class) known as the Paramahārīsa, and lead a mendicant’s life, live upon begging giving up the insignia of a monk’s life prescribed by the Smṛtis, which are the means of livelihood for those who have merely taken recourse to that life. Witness the Smṛtis: ‘The knower of Brahman wears no signs,’ ‘Therefore the knower of religion, who wears no signs, (should practise its principles)’ (cf. Mbh. XIV. xlvi. 51), and ‘His signs are not manifest, nor his behaviour’ (cf. Va. X.). And the Śruti: ‘Then he becomes a monk, wears the ochre robe, shaves his head, and does not accept (superfluous) gifts,’ etc. (Jā. 5); also, ‘Having cut off his hair together with the tuft and giving up the holy thread,’ etc. (Kṣ. I., II. 3).

ननु ‘व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्य चरन्ति’ इति वर्तमानापदेशात् अर्थवादोऽयम्; न
विधायकः प्रत्ययः कक्षिक्षूयते लिल्लोऽस्मानः तत्सात् अर्थवादाग्रेण
शुरुतिमेतिविहितानां यज्ञोपवीतादिनां साधनानां न शक्तेत् परित्यागः
कारिपतुम्; ‘यज्ञोपवीतत्वं वापि यज्ञवेचजेत् वा’ (तं. आ. २११.२)। पारिवाराये
तावद्धृष्यस्य विहितम् — ‘वेदंस्तव्यसनन्याच्छूतुस्तरस्माहेद् न सत्यसेत्’ इति ; ‘स्वाघाय
एवोत्सृष्यमानो वाचम्’ (आ. ध. २११.१०) इति च आपस्तम्भः; ‘ब्रह्मोपजेवोदिने
च कौटसाध्यं सुहृद्धः। गाहितांशवत्तायोजेतिधि: सुरापानसमानिष्टः’ (मनु. ११.५६) —
इति वेदपरित्यागे दौष्ट्रव्रतानि। ‘उपासने मुरुणां वृद्धानामातिश्रीनां होमे जायकर्मणि
भोजन आचमने स्वाध्याये च यज्ञोपवीती स्वात’ (आ. ध. ११५.१।१) इति
परिवाराकर्मेन्वैव च गुरुपासस्वाभायः अज्ञाताच्च मानादिनां कर्मणां शुरुतिमेतिषु
कर्त्त्वत्वा चोदित्तत्वात् गुर्वायुपासनात्मकं यज्ञोपवीतस्य विहितत्वात् तत्परित्यागो
नैवावगन्तुशािक्षः। यथापि एषांभयो व्युत्थायेन विधीयत एव, तथापि
पुश्चर्यांशत्तथान्यात्मानेन विधीयत एव, व्युत्थानम्, न तु सर्वसाधनाचः